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ABSTRACT
The assaults on Fallujah by the United States military in April and November 2004
involved the use of white phosphorus. White phosphorus has extremely damaging effects
on the health of victims, including severe burns and irritation of the respiratory system.
This article examines whether the use of white phosphorus was a violation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, Protocol III to the Convention on Conventional
Weapons and international humanitarian law. It concludes that the use of white
phosphorus was illegal as it could be argued to be a chemical weapon, a riot control
agent, or incendiary weapon. Furthermore, the methods and means of its use in Fallujah
violated the wars of law.
1.0 Introduction1

“If we fight a war and win it with H-bombs, what history will
remember is not the ideals we were fighting for but the methods we
used to accomplish them.”
- Hans A. Berthe

As this quotation by Nobel Prize winner Hans A. Berthe suggests, methods and means of
warfare have long lasting effects on a war’s legacy. Although using certain weapons and
tactics may achieve some level of military success, their use must be tempered with
humanitarian principles. Throughout most of the Iraq war, the media has glossed over the
impact and legality of weapons and tactics used by the Coalition forces. One issue that
deserved wider public discussion is the use by US military of certain controversial
weaponry during the Fallujah assaults of 2004, in particular the use of white phosphorus.

1

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor John Dugard and Lisa Tabassi for their

invaluable assistance and supervision in the research and writing of this article.

3

Although a number of news outlets described it as a chemical weapon, little detailed
discussion of its legal status was undertaken. This paper endeavours to examine whether
the use of white phosphorus was a violation of international law. Part one will outline the
background to the US assault in Fallujah as well as the various allegations of white
phosphorus use. Part two will discuss how the alleged use fits in the legal framework
banning chemical weapons use. Part three will discuss whether the use of white
phosphorus could also be considered as a breach of the various rules governing the use of
incendiary weapons. Regardless of its legality, the use of weapons such as white
phosphorus was a flawed strategy and could only have contributed to further stiffening
the resolve of those opposing the Coalition’s presence in Iraq.

2.0 Background
2.1 Fallujah City
Lying approximately forty miles to the west of Baghdad, Fallujah is situated in the heart
of what has been coined the ‘Sunni Triangle’, a triangular shaped area lying to the north
and west of Baghdad. The Triangle stretches from Baghdad in the east, to Tikrit2 to the
north, and Ramadi in the west. Contained within this Triangle are the towns of Samara
and Fallujah.3 As its name suggests, it is inhabited predominantly by Sunni Muslims, the
ethnic group of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This area has witnessed
widespread violence since the 2003 invasion due to high insurgent activity. During 2003
2

Tikrit, the home-town of Saddam Hussein, is infamous for being a stronghold of regime die-hards,

powerful tribes and senior Baath Party members. See http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0924/p01s02woiq.html
3
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and 2004, it was described as Iraq’s “most volatile region, and a hotbed for opposition
against the US led occupation”4, as well as being a “dangerous ground for US soldiers”.5

Fallujah’s lawlessness became evident when on the 31 March 2004, four US private
military contractors from the security firm Blackwater USA were dragged from their
vehicles, their bodies mutilated, set on fire and hung from a bridge. Within days,
beginning on 4 April 2004, Operation Vigilant Resolve was launched, featuring 1200 US
Marines, backed by two Iraqi Security Force Battalions. Over the course of a week, this
operation swept through a number of cities in the region aiming to quell the violence and
regain control. Particular focus was on ridding Fallujah of the insurgents. With the city
sealed, and a night-time curfew imposed, the coalition forces met fierce urban resistance,
requiring dangerous house-to-house searches.6 In total, approximately 600 Iraqis were
reported dead7 and high a number of high value targets were apprehended.8 By April 9,
4
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the US announced a unilateral suspension of fighting. By the end of April, after intense
international pressure to end the siege,9 an agreement was reached whereby the local
population would keep the resistance fighters out of the city. The ‘Fallujah Protection
Army’ was established to maintain peace, led by former Revolutionary Guard brigade
commander and current Iraqi force General Jasim Mohamed Saleh. The force was
approximately 1100 strong and would operate independently of the US military.10
Despite a ceasefire being announced in May, skirmishes continued for the following
months.

In October 2004, the violence in Fallujah re-escalated, and it became clear that the city
had fallen back into the hands of the insurgency. In response, on 8 November 2004,
Operation al-Fajr (‘Dawn’ in Arabic) was executed.11 This involved a force of 10,000 –
12,000 US Marines, supported by the Iraqi troops.12 The US and the Iraqi Interim
Government authorized the assault.13 Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi gave his authorization
largely as a result of the failed negotiations between the Government and the Fallujah
representatives to eject the foreign fighters suspected to be in the city. One such insurgent

9
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believed to have been present was the infamous Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab alZarqawi. In the lead up to the assault, the city was encircled by US forces who warned
the Fallujah residents of the impending attack, strongly urging them to leave. US officials
believe that of the 300,000 citizens, 70 – 90% had fled, seeking refuge in neighbouring
towns, and that a force of 2,000 – 3,000 insurgents remained behind. 14 It was later
acknowledged by US General George Casey that al-Zarqawi had fled by 9 November.15
In the first stage of the assault, the Marines took control of strategic bridges and a
hospital on the western side of the town. By 15 November, the town was largely under
US control except for the southern Shuhada District in which fierce fighting remained.
Upon the US military securing a part of the city, it was turned over to Iraqi forces. During
the assault, important discoveries were made, such as large arms caches, and heavily
fortified underground bunkers connected through a network of tunnels. During the
assault, which lasted until late January 2005, the US forces had suffered 71 fatalities16
and 275 injuries.17 Between 1,200 – 1,600 insurgents were reported killed, as well as
2,000 civilians.18

It was during this campaign that the allegations of white phosphorus use by coalition
forces emerged.
14
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2.2 Allegations
The following is a summary of the various accounts regarding white phosphorus use by
US marines.

The first report was written by embedded journalist Darrin Mortenson, published on 10
April 2004, in the North County Times regarding Operation Vigilant Resolve of April
2004. He wrote:

“Bogert is a mortar team leader who directed his men to fire round after
round of high explosives and white phosphorus charges into the city Friday
and Saturday, never knowing what the targets were or what damage the
resulting explosions caused.”19

Then, under a sub-heading entitled “Shake ‘n’ bake” he wrote:

“‘Gun up!’ Milikin yelled when they finished a few seconds later, grabbing
a white phosphorus round from a nearby ammo can and holding it over the
tube.

‘Fire!’ Bogert yelled, as Milikin dropped it.

19

Darrin Mortenson, Violence subsides for Marines in Fallujah, North Country Times, 10 April 2004.

8

‘The boom kicked dust around the put as they ran through the drill again
and again, sending a mixture of burning white phosphorus and high
explosives they call ‘shake ‘n’ bake’ into a cluster of buildings where
insurgents have been spotted all week.

They say they have never seen what they’ve hit, nor did they talk about it as
they dusted off their breakfast and continued their hilarious routine of
personal insults and name-calling.”20

In an email correspondence with The Independent, the same reporter confirmed:

“During the fight I was describing in my article, WP mortar rounds were
used to create a fire in a palm grove and a cluster of concrete buildings that
were used as cover by Iraqi snipers and teams that fired heavy machine guns
at US choppers.”21

A further account of the Fallujah assault was detailed in a March-April 2005 journal,
Field Artillery. This report, written not by journalists but by three US artillerymen,
discussed their view of the operation from a tactical perspective. Under the subheading
‘Munitions’ were written the following passages:

20

Id.

21
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“WP proved to be an effective and versatile munition. We used it for
screening missions at two breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent
psychological weapon against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes
when we could not get effects on them with [high explosive rounds]. We
fired ‘shake and bake’ missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them
out and [high explosive rounds] to take them out.

[…]

We could have used [hexachloroethane zinc smoke (HC) and precisionguided munitions]. We used improved WP for screening missions when HC
smoke would have been more effective and saved our WP for lethal
missions.”22

The Washington Post reported on 10 November 2004:

“Some artillery guns fired white phosphorous rounds that create a screen of
fire that cannot be extinguished with water. Insurgents reported being

22

Captain James T. Cobb, First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour, and Sergeant First Class William H.

Hight, TF 2-2 in FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah, Field Artillery, March-April 2005.
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attacked with a substance that melted their skin, a reaction consistent with
white phosphorous burns.”23

In the same report, a physician at a regional hospital reported as having said the corpses
of the insurgents “were burned and some corpses were melted.”24

On 8 November 2005, the Italian state television network, RAI, aired the documentary
Fallujah: The Hidden Massacre, by Sigfrido Ranucci, which documented the use of
white phosphorus during the November 2004 Fallujah assault. In it, Mohammad Tareq, a
human rights campaigner, reported that many victims suffered serious burns. He claimed
the clothes of some of the victims appeared to be intact even though their bodies were
badly burned. The documentary alleged that civilians, including women and children, had
been killed through white phosphorus attacks. Images of such bodies were shown. Critics
of this film have said that such reports are inconsistent with the use of white phosphorus
as it would also have burned their clothes.25 The bodies from the RAI film could also
have had such an appearance from exposure to the elements.26 As such, the evidence
provided by the documentary was not entirely convincing, and consequently it will not
carry much evidentiary weight in the analysis below.

23
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24
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In the RAI documentary, a former US Marine that fought in Fallujah during November
2004 commented about white phosphorus use:

“I heard the order to pay attention because they were going to use white
phosphorus on Fallujah. In military jargon it’s known as Willy Pete …
Phosphorus burns bodies, in fact it melts the flesh all the way down to the
bone … I saw the burned bodies of women and children.”27

An unembedded Iraqi journalist, Dahr Jamail, who had been collecting testimony from
Fallujah’s refugees, had spoken to a doctor who had remained in the city to help people
and who had encountered numerous reports of civilians suffering unusual burns.28 A
resident told the Mr. Jamail that the US had used “weird bombs that put up smoke like a
mushroom cloud” and that he watched “pieces of these bombs explode into large fires
that continued to burn on the skin even after people dumped water on the burns.”29 The
doctor said he “treated people who had their skin melted”.30

The response by the US government changed as the story gathered media momentum.
The Wall Street Journal quoted Lieutenant General Walter Buchanan III, commander of
the US Central Command Air Forces, as saying that white phosphorus “is purely used as

27
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Buncombe and Hughes, note 20, supra.

29

Id.

30

Id.

12

a marking round, not a weapon.”31 Similar statements were issued from the US Embassy
in Rome, which said: “To maintain that US forces have been using [white phosphorus]
against human targets … is simply mistaken”, and from the US Ambassador in London,
Robert Tuttle who wrote to The Independent claiming white phosphorus was only used as
an obscurant or else for marking targets. 32 He further stated, “US forces participating in
Operation Iraqi Freedom continue to use appropriate, lawful and conventional weapons
against legitimate targets. US forces do not use napalm or phosphorus as weapons”.33 The
US State Department’s Counter Misinformation Office provided a similar position,
stating that the use of phosphorus shells is not outlawed and that “US forces have used
them very sparingly in Fallujah, for illuminating purposes. They were fired into the air to
illuminate enemy positions at night, not at enemy fighters.”34 However, on 10 November
2005, the official US position was revised with an acknowledgement that it had
previously been incorrect. It stated that,

“White Phosphorus shells, which produce smoke, were used in Fallujah not
for illuminating but for screening purposes, i.e., obscuring troop movements
and according to an article, “The Fight for Fallujah”, in the March-April
2005 issue of Field Artillery magazine, “as a potent psychological weapon
31

Darrin Mortenson, Official Waffling on White Phosphorus Fuels Debate Abroad, North Country Times,

November 22 2005.
32

Buncombe and Hughes, note 20, supra.
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against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes …” The article states
that U.S. forces used white phosphorus rounds to flush out enemy fighters
so that they could then be killed with high explosive rounds.”35

On 15 November 2005 the US Department of Defence Spokesperson, Lieutenant-Colonel
Barry Venable confirmed to the BBC Radio 4 PM programme that white phosphorus had
indeed been used in Fallujah, however he denied that it was a chemical weapon.36
Lieutenant-Colonel Venable acknowledged that US forces could use white phosphorus in
order to flush out enemy troops from covered positions and that the US considers it to be
“an incendiary weapon [that] may be used against enemy combatants.”37

"We use them primarily as obscurants, for smokescreens or target marking
in some cases. However it is an incendiary weapon and may be used against
enemy combatants."38

In response to the question whether it was used as an offensive weapon during the
Fallujah assault, he confirmed: "Yes, it was used as an incendiary weapon against enemy
combatants".39 He continued,
35

US Department of State, note 33, supra.

36

US Used White Phosphorus in Fallujah, BBC News, 16 November 2006,
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"When you have enemy forces that are in covered positions that your high
explosive artillery rounds are not having an impact on and you wish to get
them out of those positions, one technique is to fire a white phosphorus
round into the position because the combined effects of the fire and smoke and in some case the terror brought about the explosion on the ground - will
drive them out of the holes so that you can kill them with high explosives".40

In a report on 22 November 2005 in the North County Times, Colonel Dave Lapan, top
spokesman for the US Marine force in Iraq, maintained that white phosphorus bombs
could be unleashed on insurgents. In an email to reporter Darrin Mortenson he wrote, “It
is a conventional weapon used as an obscurant, for marking and illumination, and may be
used against enemy forces.”41 He continued:

“As with any weapon in our inventory, we consider the target vulnerability
and location, available munitions, risk to the civilian population, and risk to
friendly forces in determining how a target will be attacked.”42

40

Id.

41
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42

Id.
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For the purposes of this thesis the allegations above will be assumed to be factual. The
following is a summary of what the legal analysis presented below will be based on:

-

White phosphorus was used during the Fallujah assaults of 2004;

-

White phosphorus was fired at suspected insurgent positions in order to flush
them out and kill them with high explosives;

-

The marines were often not aware of who their targets were, or what damage was
being caused;

-

Although non-combatants were not intentionally targeted, the difficulty in
distinguishing them from the combatant insurgents in the urban setting and from
controlling the indiscriminate effects of white phosphorus meant the noncombatants suffered the effects of the attack.

2.3 The Chemistry and Utility of White Phosphorus
White Phosphorus is a white (or yellow) solid with a garlic-like odour. It burns very
easily, catching fire at temperatures 10-15 degrees Fahrenheit above room temperature. It
reacts very easily with oxygen, and, as a result, is normally stored in water. It does not
occur naturally.43

White phosphorus has a number of uses, including fertilizers, food additives, cleaning
compounds, and in the past was used for rat and roach poisons as well as in fireworks. Its

43

Public Health Statement for White Phosphorus, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

(ATSDR), September 1997, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/phs103.html (accessed 12 June 2006).
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most infamous use was in the manufacture of matches but due to the severe side effects
during the manufacturing process to the workers’ health, it was replaced with another
chemical.

Its most useful military application is as a smoke screen. When fired, either from mortar,
artillery or grenade, it would burn and produce a dense white smoke. It has proven
extremely useful as a screening agent to obscure troop movements.

The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes white phosphorus as
“extremely toxic to humans”.44 There are two ways white phosphorus impacts human
health: firstly, the effect of white phosphorus particles; secondly, the effect of white
phosphorus smoke. These will be discussed below.

As mentioned above, white phosphorus burns very easily. It is described as a phyophobic
material in that it is spontaneously flammable. Upon exposure to air, it oxidizes to form
phosphorus pentoxide. During this process, immense heat is released in the form of a
bright flame with dense white smoke. This process continues until all phosphorus has
oxidized or until it has been deprived of oxygen. When the burning particles come into
contact with exposed skin it can cause serious second and third degree burns. It has rapid
dermal penetration and results in deep and painful burns.45 Once the particle is under the
44

Phosphorus, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, January 2000,
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45
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skin, it will burn until it is used up or deprived of oxygen. As such, it is very capable of
burning right to the bone. Water may temporarily stop the burning, but once it has dried
off, and the particle has access to oxygen, it will reignite. Aside from death or serious
burns, the victim of a white phosphorus burn may also develop heart, liver and kidney
damage as a result.46 Inhalation of the white phosphorus particles in the smoke could
cause serious damage to the lungs and throat.47

White phosphorus smoke also possesses physiological effects on the human body. White
phosphorus smoke is composed of particles of phosphorus pentoxide, which reacts with
moisture in the air or body to form phosphoric acid.48 This acid, depending on its
concentration and the duration of exposure, may produce a variety of topically irritative
injuries to the victim.49 Few studies have been conducted regarding the effects of
inhalation of white phosphorus smoke on human health. One such study was in 1935
when White and Armstrong conducted a series of tests on human volunteers.50 Male
subjects were exposed to white phosphorus smoke at various concentrations. At the
lowest concentration (phosphorus pentoxide at 188mg/m3) a five-minute exposure
resulted with half the subjects reporting respiratory distress, coughing, congestion and

46

ATSDR, note 42, supra.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

GlobalSecurity.org, note 44, supra.

50

Toxicity of Military Smokes and Obscurants, National Academy of Sciences, Vol 2, at 24, available at:

www.nap.edu/catalog/9621.html (accessed 12 June 2006).
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throat irritation.51 At a higher concentration (phosphorus pentoxide at 514mg/m3) a 15
minute exposure resulted in all subjects reporting tightness of chest, coughing, nose
irritation, and difficulty speaking.52 In a further study, human volunteers were exposed
for 3.5 minutes (phosphorus pentoxide at 592mg/m3) resulting in similar respiratory
irritation, tightness of chest, coughing and difficulty breathing. Following this
experiment, the subjects refused to be exposed to a higher concentration and thought it
would be impossible, without more serious effects, to perform any physical exercise or
labour at that concentration.53 In one such experiment one of the subjects developed acute
bronchitis.54 Importantly, all these effects were reversible once the subject had left the
exposure site.55

In summary, white phosphorus is a volatile chemical causing serious burns to the victim.
In this state, it could be potentially considered as an incendiary weapon. When oxidised,
it causes irritation to the respiratory system and mucus membranes. In this state, it could
potentially be used as a chemical weapon. The following is an analysis of the legal
regime governing such uses.

3.0 Chemical Weapons

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.
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One of the principle allegations against white phosphorus use in Fallujah is that it
amounted to the use of a chemical weapon, thereby violating international treaty and
customary law. In order to ascertain the law, Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice provides which sources may be relied upon, i.e.,
international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, and judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. In light of this
provision, the following is an analysis of the law governing chemical weapon use and its
application to the Fallujah assault.56

3.1 Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Use
International treaty and customary law clearly prohibit the use of chemical weapons.

3.1.1 Treaty Law
The euphoria following the Cold War, coupled with the international condemnation of
the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and in Kurdistan, created fertile
ground for the development of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. In 1993, the
Convention on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on their Destruction (also known as ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’ or ‘CWC’)
was concluded. It opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29
April 1997, currently boasting 178 States Parties, including the United States, Russia,
Iran, India, and Pakistan.

57

56

1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1).

57

As of 13 June 2006.
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The CWC has a much broader scope of application than any previous regime. Under
Article I, each State Party undertakes “never under any circumstances to use a chemical
58
weapon” or “To develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer, directly or indirectly,

chemical weapons to anyone.”59 Likewise, a State may not “engage in any military
preparations to use chemical weapons”60, or “assist, encourage or induce, in any way,
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”61
States are also required to destroy their current (and abandoned) chemical weapon
stockpiles, and any current or former production facilities.62 The phrase “never under any
circumstances” emphasizes the comprehensive and totally binding character of the
prohibitions.63 Geographically, the prohibitions possess a universal character, applying to
the activities of States Parties everywhere.64 The wording is such that it covers
international and non-international armed conflicts, regardless of whether the parties
recognize each other.65 Furthermore, State Parties are required to adopt penal legislation

58

1993 Convention on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on

their Destruction (hereinafter ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention’) Article 1 (1)(b).
59

Id. Article I (1)(a).

60

Id. Article I(1)(c).

61

Id. Article I(1)(d).

62

Id. Article I(2) – (4).

63

Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, (1994) 12.

64

Id. 13.

65

Id. 13
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to enforce the convention and extend that legislation extraterritorially to national persons
holding their nationality.66 Reservations to the Articles of this Treaty are not permitted.67

3.1.2 Customary International Law
Although early attempts to prohibit the use of chemical weapons date back to 1865,
where an agreement between the French and German armies is recorded as stating “that
no side should use poisoned bullets”,68 no multilateral approach was undertaken until the
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. A declaration was adopted at the 1899
Conference prohibiting “the use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases”.69 In addition, both the 1899 and 1907 Conferences
included prohibitions on the use of “poison or poisoned weapons”.70 Unfortunately, these
provisions proved unsuccessful, as in 1915, during the First World War battle of Ypres,
the German military unleashed a chemical attack against the French forces. This led the

66

The Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VII(1)(c).

67

The Chemical Weapons Convention, Article XXII.

68

Margaret Sewell, Freedom from Fear: Prosecuting the Iraqi Regime for the Use of Chemical Weapons,

16 St. Thomas L. Rev. 365, 378 (2004).
69

Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases, July 29,

1899, reprinted in A Manual on International Humanitarian Law and Arms Control Agreements 99 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2000) [hereinafter Hague Declaration].
70

First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899, reprinted in 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 103, 105; Second

International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907, reprinted in 2 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 106.
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English, French and Americans to retaliate in kind. During the First World War, 1.3
million casualties were caused by such chemical attacks.71

The Treaty of Versailles provided further prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons.
Germany was banned from their possession and use. Their use was also outlawed in the
Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare 1922 (the
latter of which never entered into force).72

It was not until the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
(hereinafter ‘Geneva Protocol’) opened for signature in 1925 that a relatively broader ban
was implemented. The Geneva Protocol outlawed “the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids materials or devices […]”

The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Protocol had a number of serious limitations.
Firstly, both were merely prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and providing no
safeguards against their possession, development, transfer, or stockpile.73 Secondly, the
ban on use only applied as between states parties to the instruments, and had no effect on
the use of the weapons against a non-state party. Furthermore, the Hague Convention
71

David B. Merkin, The Efficiency of Chemical Arms Treaties in the Aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, 9

B.U. Int’l L. J. 175, 177 (1991).
72
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applied only during war.74 Thirdly, a large number of States entered reservations to the
Geneva Protocol allowing them the right to retaliate in kind if they are attacked with
chemical weapons. This rendered the applicability of the Protocol merely as a ban on first
use.75 Regardless of the limitations, these instruments were a step towards chemical
disarmament and formed the basis of the international arms control regime throughout
most of the Twentieth Century.

3.2 Legal Framework
3.2.1 What is a Chemical Weapon?
In order to establish what chemicals and activities fall within the prohibitions outlined
above, Article II of the CWC provides a set of definitions. The CWC has a unique
formulation for identifying chemical weapons. Article II(1)(a) defines a chemical weapon
as:

(a) “Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in
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subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of employment of
such munitions and devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with
the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b).”

The above are considered chemical weapons, together or separately.76 Although a list of
toxic chemicals and precursors considered to be of particular danger are provided in three
schedules annexed to the Convention, these are included not to further define chemical
weapons, but to serve as the list of chemicals subject to declaration, inspection and
verification under the Convention. The definition is based on two central questions,
firstly, is it a toxic chemical or precursor, and secondly, what is the intent of use? In
assessing whether a substance is a chemical weapon, the definition of a chemical weapon
must be read together with the definition of toxic chemicals, precursors, and purposes not
prohibited.

3.2.2 What is a Toxic Chemical?
Toxic chemicals are defined in Article II(2) as:

“Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals. This includes all such chemicals regardless of their origin or of
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their method of production, regardless of whether they are produced in
facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.”

In order to fall within this definition, the chemical must, as a result of its chemical action
on life processes, cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or
animals.77 This highlights two important issues. Firstly, the intent for utilizing the
chemical must be to exploit its toxic properties, which manifest themselves through the
chemical action on life processes. As a result, other toxic or harmful chemicals, such as
dynamite, incendiaries, smoke mixtures, missile fuel and so forth, of which the toxic
properties are not being exploited and where the toxic side-effects are incidental to the
intended use of the substance, would not be considered to be chemical weapon. An
example to clarify this issue is that if death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
arose out of exposure to missile fuel, and that the intent of the exposure did not rely on
the toxic properties of the fuel, it would not be considered a chemical weapon. However,
if the fuel were sprayed upon the victims with the intent to exploit its toxic properties, it
would be a chemical weapon. The terms ‘temporary incapacitation’ and ‘permanent
harm’ are not further defined in the Convention. The second issue this paragraph raises is
that toxicity is not dependent upon lethality. The toxic effect can also fall within a lower
standard of causing temporary incapacitation or permanent harm. This is echoed in
Article I(1)(b) where it refers to munitions and devices causing “death or other harm”.
Therefore, lethality is not a requirement for coming within the terms of this definition.
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3.2.3 What are Precursors?
The CWC defines precursors in Article II(1)(c) as:

“Any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by
whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a
binary or multicomponent chemical system.”

Taking the plain and ordinary meaning of these words creates a potentially very broad
definition. The words ‘at any stage in the production’ and ‘by whatever method’ allow
this to apply to a very wide variety of chemical reactants. It would seemingly include, for
example, an agent that reacts with chemicals in the air or body to form a lethal chemical
agent. As Trapp & Krutzsch write, since this is an entirely open-ended definition, it
should be read in conjunction with the general purpose criterion in Article II(1)(a),
thereby requiring the intent criteria to be the ultimate determining factor.78 If the intent
criterion is satisfied, the use of a precursor would amount to the use of a chemical
weapon.

3.2.4 Lawful Use – ‘Purposes not Prohibited’
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The CWC was not designed to stifle international trade or the technological development
of the chemical industry.79 As many chemicals have dual uses, the Convention’s drafters
understood that legitimate purposes should not be hindered. Therefore, they specified the
permitted uses of toxic chemicals and precursors. These “purposes not prohibited” are
defined in Article II(9) as:

“(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes;
(b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection
against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;
(c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and
not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of
warfare;
(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.”

Of particular importance to the present discussion are paragraphs (c) and (d). These relate
to the legitimate use of a toxic chemical by military or law enforcement personnel.
Paragraph (d) will be discussed in the ‘riot control agent section’ below. Paragraph (c)
creates an exception, similar to the missile fuel example outlined above, by which a toxic
chemical may be utilized for military purposes so long as such use is not dependent on
79
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the toxic properties of the chemical as a method of warfare. This relies therefore on the
intent of the chemical’s application.

3.2.5 Summary
These various definitions and criteria were carefully negotiated so that, read together, no
loopholes would exist in the ban on chemical weapons. The definition of a chemical
weapon is entirely purpose driven: all toxic chemicals and their precursors are chemical
weapons, unless intended for purposes not prohibited and in types and quantities
consistent with that purpose.

3.3 Application to Fallujah
During the debate surrounding white phosphorus use in Fallujah, a central accusation laid
at the US forces was that such use was a violation of the prohibition against the use of a
chemical weapon. This argument has some strength to it. Although poorly advocated in
the news media, the use of white phosphorus by US forces was a violation of the
prohibition against use of a chemical weapon. As outlined above, for it to be a chemical
weapon, it must be considered either as a toxic chemical or a precursor. The following
requirements must be fulfilled:

1. Is it a toxic chemical or precursor?
2. Was it used for purposes prohibited by the CWC?
3. If so, were the types and quantities consistent with such use?
4. Was the intent of use the exploitation of the chemicals’ toxic properties?
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If the final answer is ‘yes’, then white phosphorus is a chemical weapon, and the
prohibition against chemical weapons use was violated.

Before analysing further, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
must be noted. It states that a treaty “[…] shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. ” This must be kept in mind in order not to create an
overly stretched legal analysis.

Firstly, is white phosphorus a toxic chemical? As is recalled, this requires that the
chemical’s action on life processes causes death, temporary incapacitation or permanent
harm. Looking at the chemical nature of white phosphorus, and its reaction in the human
body, it does not appear to have the required chemical action on life processes. Rather,
the physiological effect of the chemicals coming in contact with the skin is closer to that
of an incendiary weapon.80 It burns the skin through the heat it generates, rather than as
part of a chemical reaction. The evidence from the Fallujah assault supports this, as many
victims of the Fallujah assault complained of suffering strange burns that could not be
extinguished with water. As such, it is unlikely that white phosphorus would be
considered to be a toxic chemical, and thereby a chemical weapon.
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In the alternative, it is arguable that white phosphorus smoke is a precursor as defined in
the CWC. As discussed above, the CWC definition of a precursor is broad, being any
chemical reactant that takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a
toxic chemical. Looking at the chemical reactions that occurred, when the mortar shells
containing the chemical were detonated, the burning phosphorus released a dense white
smoke, containing phosphorus pentoxide and phosphoric acid, which irritated the body.
White phosphorus was the precursor element taking part in the first stage of that process.
Alone, it was not a chemical weapon as its effect was through heat and burns. However,
when reacting with oxygen and water in the air or body, the chemical reaction was
complete. The CWC definition of ‘precursor’ also requires that the final produced
chemical is a toxic chemical, as defined in Article II(2). This toxic chemical must cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans through its chemical action
on life processes. These three requirements are read disjunctively. Although death is
possible if exposed to an overwhelming amount of phosphoric acid, temporary
incapacitation is the most applicable criteria of the test. If interpreted broadly, it could
mean that because the insurgents or civilians were unable maintain positions, fight
effectively, and operate as they normally would, they were temporarily incapacitated. A
narrower reading would argue that it requires loss of consciousness, such as was seen
during the use of an unknown chemical agent by Russian forces during the November
2002 Moscow theatre hostage siege. Both of these interpretations are arguable as no
definition of temporary incapacitation exists in the Convention. However, by taking into
consideration the CWC’s Preamble, which states that it is determined for the sake of all
mankind to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, and by
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upholding the VCLT Article 31(1), the better interpretation is likely to fall on the side of
a broader reading. With such a reading, the conclusion on this issue is that the effect
white phosphorus smoke has on its victims is one of temporary incapacitation, which
brings it within the definition of a chemical weapon.

The use does not fall within one of the exceptions provided for in the ‘purposes not
prohibited’. Article II(9)(c) does not apply as this is not a use ‘not dependent on the use
of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare’. It was not used as a smoke
screen but clearly dependent upon the toxic properties of white phosphorus as a
precursor.

The final element to prove is the intent of the commander ordering white phosphorus use
taking advantage of its toxic properties? Following the assumptions laid out in the
allegations above, the use of the white phosphorus was in order to flush the insurgents
from their protected spaces in order to fire high explosive rounds as they exited the
building. White phosphorus was used as a precursor chemical reactant, with the intent of
exploiting the toxic properties of the phosphoric acid it produced.

The conclusion is that due to the method and intent in which white phosphorus was
employed, it amounted to being a precursor not being used for purposes not prohibited
and, thus, a chemical weapon, the use of which is strictly prohibited under any
circumstances by the CWC. The US, thereby, breached its obligations under this
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Convention.

4.0 Riot Control Agent
Another CWC prohibition potentially violated by the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah
is regarding the use of a riot control agent (RCA) as a method of warfare. Prior to the
adoption of the Convention, international law was somewhat ambiguous as to whether
RCAs were considered to be chemical weapons, largely because the Geneva Protocol did
not directly address the issue. During the Vietnam War, US forces came under heavy
criticism for their use of tear gas as a method of warfare. It was primarily used to
demobilize and disorientate the enemy, and was often followed with rounds of lethal
conventional munitions. Allegations also accused the North Vietnamese for committing
similar acts. The status of RCAs under international law and the actions of the US in
Fallujah will now be examined.

4.1 General Purpose Criterion
The CWC is the first treaty to deal specifically with the issue of RCAs. Article I(5) states
that “Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”
RCA’s are defined in Article II(7) as “Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can
produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which
disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.” There is some
disagreement between the US position and that of the rest of the world as to what acts
this prohibition encompasses. The US argues that the only law regulating RCA use is
Article I(5) coupled with the corresponding definition in Article II(7). Therefore, the US
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argues, the prohibition against RCA use as a method of warfare is the only constraint. If
this were correct, it would permit a state to develop, produce, retain and transfer riot
control agents in any form and in any quantity, so long as it did not actually use them as a
method of warfare.81 This goes against the purposes and principles of the CWC and
would allow a large class of toxic chemicals to evade the Convention’s control
mechanisms.82 It would also create a system replicating what already existed under the
Geneva Protocol, in which only use was prohibited, and not the development, production,
retention, transfer of certain agents.

However, most States Parties to the CWC agree that it contains further restrictions,
namely that the general purpose criterion applies to RCAs. They argue that by definition,
an RCA is a toxic chemical. This is because the Convention defines a toxic chemical as
“Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death,
temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.” Comparing this to
the definition of an RCA, the RCA must cause “sensory irritation or disabling physical
effects”. All chemicals that cause such irritation or disabling physical effects would
naturally be causing temporary incapacitation.83 RCAs must by definition be viewed as a
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subset of toxic chemicals.84 Consequently, this brings RCAs into the restrictions of the
general purpose criterion defined in Article II(1). The General Purpose Criterion has a
central role in the Convention and it would be surprising that some toxic chemicals were
covered and some excluded. The implications of this reasoning is that RCAs may only be
used in a situation which is not a method of warfare, complies with the purposes not
prohibited exceptions under Article II(9), and as long as the types and quantities were
consistent with such purposes. The purposes not prohibited sub-paragraphs relevant to the
present discussion are (9)(c) and (d).

Of the two positions outlined above, the history of the Convention, its object and
purpose, its text, and the state practice all lend support to the second more restrictive
argument. An oft-quoted example of applying the above reasoning involves the following
situation: imagine a stockpile of howitzer shells loaded with a toxic chemical that meets
the RCA requirements of Article II(7). This RCA, due to it temporarily incapacitating its
victims, is a toxic chemical under Article II(2) and thereby falls within the general
purpose criterion requirements. At this point, two issues need to be addressed: Firstly,
was its use intended for purposes not prohibited under Article II(9)? Secondly, were the
types and quantities consistent with such purposes? In applying this, the only two
purposes in Article II(9) which could possibly apply to this example are sub-paragraphs
(c) and (d). On closer inspection, it is evident that sub-paragraph (c) (which requires that
“the agent is used for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons
and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of
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warfare”) would not apply as the inferred intent from loading and using howitzer shells
with an RCA is unlikely to involve anything but the exploitation of the agents’ toxic
properties as a method of warfare. Equally, sub-paragraph (d) is inapplicable as no
legitimate argument could be raised that howitzer shells were used for “law enforcement
including domestic riot control purposes”. Even if the example were to fall within one of
these non-prohibited purposes, the types and quantities used would still be inconsistent
with the permitted use in either of these sub-paragraphs. The shells and the agent would
therefore be considered as chemical weapons. Any use would result in a violation of the
CWC prohibition on use of a chemical weapon.

In summary therefore, the requirements that must be satisfied to establish whether an
RCA is considered a chemical weapon, are as follows:
1. Was the chemical used considered a RCA under the CWC?
2. Was the RCA used as a method of warfare?
3. Did the use fall under one of the purposes not prohibited in Article II(9), and were
the types and quantities consistent with such purposes?

Point (1) has already been defined above. The following is an analysis of the law and an
application of points (2) and (3) to the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah.

4.2 Method of Warfare
Article I(5) of the CWC requires that RCAs not be used as a method of warfare. This was
a highly contentious section to negotiate. The final text of the CWC shows a compromise
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between the two primary opposing positions, with the US on one side and the UK
(supported by most negotiating states) on the other. No definition of method of warfare
could be agreed upon, and none is universally accepted or readily identifiable from other
sources.85

i. US Position
Before the CWC, no coherent view existed as to the legality of RCA use as a method of
warfare. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol did not address the issue directly. Most States
were of the opinion that the Protocol prohibited RCA use through the prohibition against
the use of all asphyxiating and poisonous gases and analogous materials. The US
pioneered an extreme position, where it consistently argued that the prohibition did not
apply to agents with temporary effects. However, such a view did not receive widespread
international support,86 nor unanimous approval within the US government.87 In order to
receive Senate ratification of the Protocol, US President Gerald Ford was forced into a
compromise position, in which his administration agreed to include an Executive Order
11850 (EO 11850) permitting some restricted uses of RCAs.88 The relevant section
states:
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“The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy […] first use of
riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives
such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct
and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of
war.

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to
mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas,
of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and
paramilitary organizations.”89

During the CWC negotiations, the US argued that chemical weapons should be defined in
such a way that RCAs would be excluded and therefore not prohibited.90 The US argued
89
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that RCAs may be used in numerous types of military-related activities conducted outside
international or non-international armed conflicts and defensively to save lives, as
authorized in EO 11850.91 This was an attempt by US negotiators to ensure that their
military commanders were able to retain as many tactical battlefield options as possible
and that they were not limited by what they perceived as unduly restrictive regulations.

ii. UK and Others Position
The positions of other negotiating states differed from that of the US. The UK and
Australia led the charge for prohibiting all use of RCAs in hostilities.92 They feared that
“an interpretation of the CWC that would allow use of non-lethal agents in war might
create a dangerous loophole in the Convention.”93

iii. Compromise
These two opposing positions were not easily reconciled. What brought the different
parties together was a final compromise by German Ambassador Adolf von Wagner, who
was the chairman of the Conference on Disarmament working group during the final
CWC negotiations. The wording ultimately accepted in the CWC makes a distinction
between use during hostilities as a method of warfare, which is prohibited, and use for
136.
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purposes of law enforcement, which is permitted.94 Ambassador von Wagner described
this compromise as the following:

“These [RCA’s] will be banned as a method of warfare, but allowed for
normal domestic law enforcement purposes or for non-warfare military
purposes, such as rescuing a pilot shot down behind enemy lines, or dealing
with a riot in an [sic] prisoner of war camp…”95

As Harper writes, this language by von Wagner reflects the language of the EO 11850
and shows the compromise made with the US.96 Although this is an important
prohibition, it is flawed due to its ambiguity. It allowed excessive room for interpretation.

Customary international law provides little assistance in resolving this ambiguity. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law recognizes a rule that “the use of riot-control agents as a method of
warfare is prohibited”.97 The ICRC found that the majority of states agreed that the
customary prohibition of chemical weapons applies to agents with temporary effects.98
However, it considered the US to have made consistent objections to the formation of this
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rule. Its objections were evident in regards to the Geneva Protocol and statements made
during the CWC negotiations.99 It does not accept the formation of this customary rule
and argues that it may use RCAs in defensive military modes to save lives as this would
not constitute a method of warfare.100

Would such objection to the formation of customary international law excuse the US
from its application? According to public international law, a customary norm is formed
when there is both state practice and opinio juris. However, if a state, while such a norm
is being developed, persistently objects to its formation, then it will not be bound by it.101
As the US has argued its broader position consistently throughout the development of the
norm against the use of RCA as a method of warfare, it is likely that it will be bound by
its own interpretation rather than that of the majority of the international community.

iv. US CWC Ratification
As there is disagreement regarding the interpretation of a method of warfare, it is
important to fully understand the US position on RCA use in warfare situations.

Within the US, a significant debate regarding the status of RCAs emerged as ratification
of the CWC became a priority. Under US President Bill Clinton, an interagency review
was conducted which found that the CWC precluded use of RCAs in two situations
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mentioned in EO 11850, namely, where civilians were used to screen attacks, and, the
rescue of downed aircrew. This position was confirmed by the then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.102 As a result, in his letter to the US Senate in June
1994 seeking advice and ratification of the CWC, President Clinton proposed a
modification of EO 11850, in which he suggested a more restrictive approach than that
permitted in the Executive Order. The President stated that,

“Article I(5) of the CWC prohibits Parties from using RCAs as a "method of
warfare." That phrase is not defined in the CWC. The United States
interprets this provision to mean that:

The CWC applies only to the use of RCAs in international or internal armed
conflict. Other peacetime uses of RCAs, such as normal peacekeeping
operations, law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief
operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations, and
noncombatant rescue operations conducted outside such conflicts are
unaffected by the Convention.

The CWC does not apply to all uses of RCAs in time of armed conflict. Use
of RCAs solely against noncombatants for law enforcement, riot control or
other noncombat purposes would not be considered as a "method of
warfare" and therefore would not be prohibited. Accordingly, the CWC does
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not prohibit the use of RCAs in riot control situations in areas under direct
US military control, including against rioting prisoners of war, and to
protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary
organizations in rear areas outside the zone of immediate combat.

The CWC does prohibit the use of RCAs solely against combatants. In
addition, according to the current international understanding, the CWC's
prohibition on the use of RCAs as a method of warfare also precludes the
use of RCAs even for humanitarian purposes in a situation where
combatants and noncombatants are intermingled, such as the rescue of
downed air crews, passengers and escaping prisoners and situations where
civilians are being used to mask or screen an attack. However, were the
international understanding of this issue to change, the United States would
not consider itself bound by this position.”103

As ratification drew near, President Clinton’s above approach, received opposition in the
US Senate. The Senate charge was led by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, Chairman of the
US Senate Armed Services Committee, arguing that the full range of options contained in
EO 11850 must be retained. Ultimately, Senator Nunn’s view prevailed, with the Senate
ratifying on the condition that the President agree to a list of 28 conditions. As the CWC
does not allow reservations, these conditions are not considered to be reservations, but
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rather outline the US interpretation of the CWC. The relevant condition to the present
discussion is Condition 26 which stated that RCA use would be permitted in peacetime
military operations in which the US is not a party, or under UN Charter Chapter VI or
Chapter VII peacekeeping operations where authorized by the Security Council. The
reasoning behind this is that in such operations, the US is not waging war and so any use
of RCA’s would not amount to use as a method of warfare.104 However, in contrast, were
the US to be a party to an international or internal armed conflict, the US would be barred
from using RCAs as this would be considered as use as a method of warfare.105 A week
after these conditions were presented, President Clinton agreed to abide by them. The
CWC was subsequently ratified by the US on April 27, 1997.

In light of the restrictions contained in the CWC, as well as the US Senate’s ratification
conditions, the US military developed its policy on RCA use. This policy is embodied in
the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3110.07A (hereinafter known as
‘CJCSI 3110.07A’). This instruction reflects both Condition 26 and EO 11850. The
instruction provides two situations in which RCAs would be permitted to be used:
namely, in wartime, and in peacetime. The use in war copies the four conditions set out in
EO 11850, but adds a fifth option, namely the protection and recovery of nuclear
weapons. The uses in peacetime reflect the above Condition 26, allowing the use of RCA
during peacekeeping operations.
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The US position has not received widespread international support.106 It even stands in
contrast to a report commissioned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In
1997, NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly commissioned Lord Lyell to undertake a report
on non-lethal weapons. The draft report of September 1997, entitled ‘Non-Lethal
Weapons’ (known as the Lyell Report, excerpts of which were published in Defense
News) firmly stated that RCAs could only be used in domestic law enforcement and not
in foreign peacekeeping missions.107 The problem with allowing ‘peaceful’ military
applications of RCAs is the slippery slope argument. It is very difficult in every situation
to define whether it is a peaceful military application or a method of warfare. The
prohibition against use as a method of warfare must be clear-cut in order to prevent abuse
and misunderstandings.

In summary, the official position of the United States is that RCAs may not be used as a
method of warfare, except in order to save lives as expounded by EO 11850 or in
‘peaceful’ operations as outlined in Condition 26. These exceptions are generally
considered to be for limited, life-saving, and defensive purposes. Although they do not
amount to a reservation to the CWC, these are parameters whereby the US government
will allow its commanders to act within and will not take disciplinary action over. This
position is not widely accepted and is a unilateral American interpretation. If US forces
actually employed such methods, they could be violating the CWC.
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4.2.1 Aggravating Factor
RCA in conjunction with lethal force
Would the use of RCAs in conjunction with lethal force be a violation of the prohibition
of use as a method of warfare? An example of such use is to employ an RCA to flush the
enemy out of its protected position (eg, a cave, building etc) in order to engage them with
lethal force. Would such use of RCAs as a force multiplier be considered a method of
warfare?

During Congressional testimony, Dr. Amy Smithson explained what would clearly
constitute a method of warfare:

“Distinguishing method of warfare use from a limited, defensive, life saving
use of RCAs should be a fairly straightforward matter. The law of war
describes a method of warfare as a way to attain military objectives.
According to this definition, flushing enemy soldiers from foxholes into the
line of fire, or launching an RCA attack on an enemy command post easily
qualify as method of warfare uses.”108

There is little disagreement amongst commentators that an RCA attack as a force
multiplier would come under the definition of method of warfare.109 The then US
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Secretary of Defense, William Perry, in a memorandum entitled “Riot Control Agents
and the Chemical Weapons Convention”, addressed to Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, agreed “[…] that the CWC would prevent some militarily
useful applications of RCA’s, when they would achieve a military objective, e.g. against
troops in caves.”110 The use of an RCA in such a manner would constitute a method of
warfare and be prohibited.111

One of the dangers of allowing force multiplier use of an RCA is the fear of escalation.
The enemy may not realize that the chemical is ‘merely’ an RCA and could retaliate with
a lethal agent. The Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin rightly summarizes this point:

“The question is whether the risk of further escalation does not outweigh
such limited military benefit as these uses might bring. Use of disabling
chemicals on intermingled combatants and civilians in a war zone, for
example, could lead to or become the excuse for unrestricted employment in
urban warfare.”112

4.2.2 Mitigating Factors
When weighing up whether the use of RCAs was as a method of warfare in violation of
the CWC, a number of mitigating factors deserve consideration. Although none of these
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criteria exist in the CWC itself, or would excuse the violations of the CWC, they may
lessen the severity of the accusations.

Mitigating Factor 1: Avoiding Unnecessary Non-Combatant Casualties
Harper writes that the most important measure in determining whether a particular
employment of an RCA constitutes a method of warfare is whether the goal of that
employment is to avoid unnecessary non-combatant casualties.113 As with a number of
considerations in the CWC, this factor also boils down to the intent of RCA use: was the
intent to save innocent lives, or to enhance the effects of lethal weapons? If the intent of
using RCA were to avoid unnecessary non-combatant casualties, for example in an urban
setting, then this would weigh against such use being considered a method of warfare.114
However, if used as a force multiplier, there is little room for argument that this was not
use as a method of warfare. The intent to save innocent lives was the overriding
consideration that guided the US military and civilian administration to allow the use of
RCA in certain limited situations under EO 11850.115 An example where such use could
be permitted is to control civilians rioting and threatening food convoys travelling to
refugee camps.116 The intent in such a situation is to save lives, reduce casualties and
protect the food.
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Commentators have also argued that use against enemy combatants would be barred
irrespective of purpose.117 Such use will virtually always be designed to advance some
military objective.118 Even if the intent is to save enemy combatants lives, the method is
through their harassment and/or immobilization, a military objective, and thereby
exploiting the toxic properties of the chemicals as a method of warfare.119

Mitigating Factor 2: Incidental Operations
A further mitigating factor is whether the RCA use is incidental to attaining the military
objective. A number of cases outlined in EO 11850 would fall within this factor. An
example is employing RCAs in an operation to clear civilians from the vicinity of a
downed aircraft. The primary objective of the operation is not the clearing of civilians,
but rather the recovery of the aircrew.120 As such, RCA use would be incidental to the
primary objective.

However, if the RCA were used as part of achieving the military objective, it would be
considered a method of warfare. An example is utilizing an RCA to flush soldiers from a
defensive position in a cave in order to engage them.121

4.3 Law Enforcement Purposes
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As mentioned earlier, an important aspect of the general purpose criterion defining a
chemical weapon are the ‘purposes not prohibited’ exceptions. These are situations where
use of toxic chemicals and their precursors are permitted. Of the four exceptions, Article
II(9)(d) is of relevance to the Fallujah assault. This allows use of a toxic chemical if used
for law enforcement purposes including domestic riot control, and if the types and
quantities of the chemicals used are consistent with this purpose. This argument is posed
as an additional or alternative argument in case it is found that the white phosphorus use
was not as a method of warfare.

4.3.1 Law Enforcement vs. Domestic Riot Control
There has been considerable debate over the choice of wording in Article II(9)(d). A split
has emerged over the relationship between the two phrases ‘law enforcement’ and
‘domestic riot control’. The US adopts the ordinary meaning of this phrase, that is, that
‘domestic riot control’ is a subset of ‘law enforcement’ and that other permissible law
enforcement activities exist that may not be domestic riot control.122 According to
Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, the US CWC-negotiating ambassador, in written
testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

“We understand the language ‘law enforcement including domestic riot
control’ to mean that domestic riot control is a subset of law enforcement
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activities. We understand other law enforcement activities to include:
controlling rioting prisoners of war; rescuing hostages; counter terrorist
operations; drug enforcement operations; and non-combatant
evacuation.”123

However, an opposing interpretation was proposed by the UK and supported by the
majority of negotiating states which stated that the Convention entitles states parties,

“to use toxic chemicals for law enforcement, including domestic riot control
purposes, provided that such chemicals are limited to those not listed in the
schedules to the convention and which can produce rapidly in humans
sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a
short time following termination of exposure.”124

This second interpretation has incorporated the RCA definition from Article II(7). It
consequently limits the use of chemicals for law enforcement purposes only to those
which are permitted for riot control purposes, thereby coming to the opposite
interpretation of the US and making law enforcement purposes a subset of domestic riot
123
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control.125 This interpretation complies with Article 31 of the VCLT by interpreting the
provision “[…] in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”126

According to the CWC’s Preamble, the Convention’s object and purpose is to exclude
“completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons”.127 The practical effect of the
US position is that it creates an entire class of chemicals that would be completely free
from the Convention’s prohibitions. As the CWC provides only a definition of RCAs,
and not law enforcement, and since the US considers RCAs a subset of chemicals used
for law enforcement purposes, those latter chemicals would not fall under the CWC
control mechanisms. As Professor Robinson states, the US position pays little attention to
the object and purpose of the Convention by legitimising the development, production
and stockpiling of anti-personnel chemicals having physiological effects different from
those of existing police-issue tear gases and the like.128

The consequences of this are that by adopting the US position, white phosphorus smoke
could potentially be used in a situation that is arguably one of law enforcement, but
which does not fall within the riot control definition. Although at odds with the
interpretation accepted by most CWC States Parties, the US could potentially argue that
Fallujah was a situation of law enforcement and that therefore the use of white
125
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phosphorus was permitted. However, as will be outlined below, it is unlikely that such an
interpretation is possible. The analysis below will discuss the meaning and scope of the
term ‘law enforcement’. It will also analyse issues of law enforcement authorization
under national and international law. Lastly, these will be applied to the Fallujah assault
to assess whether the situation was one of law enforcement.

4.3.2 The Meaning and Scope of ‘Law Enforcement’
As mentioned above, the CWC does not provide a separate definition of the term ‘law
enforcement’. There is confusion regarding what law may be enforced, how and where it
may be enforced, and in what circumstances.129 Krutzsch gives some guidance on this
issue. He points out that the phrase “law enforcement including domestic riot control”
presupposes a specific factual situation in which domestic law and order are violated or
endangered.130 In such a situation, the “use of force by police or other organs must be
allowed within the scope of a state’s jurisdiction to re-establish law and order.”131

‘Law enforcement’ and ‘domestic riot control’ have different meanings. Krutzsch states
that ‘law enforcement’ is the more general term, whereas ‘domestic riot control’ is more
specific. An example of law enforcement that Krutzsch provides is the reprimand by a
policeman on night patrol vis-à-vis individuals disturbing sleep. The consequences of law
129
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enforcement are a fine or arrest. In contrast, a domestic riot control situation involves
rioting citizens with the consequent security action involving cordons, police sticks,
water-canons, and tear gas.132

4.3.3 Who May Enforce the Law?
With no definition, the question of who may execute law enforcement is of vital
importance. The editors of The Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin have provided a
proposed guideline to this question:

The term “law enforcement” in Article II(9)(d) means actions taken within
the scope of a nation’s “jurisdiction to enforce” its national laws, as that
term is understood in international law. When such actions are taken in the
context of law enforcement or riot control functions under the authority of
the United Nations, they must be specifically authorized by that
organization. No act is one of “law enforcement” if it otherwise would be
prohibited as a “method of warfare” under Article II.9(c).133

i. Law Enforcement of National Law
Under national law, it is clear that the law may be enforced within a State’s territorial
boundary and upon its subjects. This is not in dispute and is a cardinal principle of
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national jurisdiction and state sovereignty. However, may a state enforce its laws within
the territory and upon the subjects of another state? As stated in the above guideline, the
phrase ‘jurisdiction to enforce’ national laws must be considered in its context of
international law. It is a cardinal principle that “a state cannot take measures on the
territory of another state by way of enforcement of national laws without the consent of
the latter.”134 Therefore, the enforcement of national law depends on territorial and
subject-matter jurisdiction.135 No person may be arrested, detained, taxed etc. on the
territory of another state, except when permitted by that state.136 In the context of the
CWC therefore, for a state to use RCA for law enforcement activities in another states’
territory, it must first receive the consent of that state.

ii) Law Enforcement of International Law
International law does not provide greater clarity to the issue. Is it permissible for a state
to justify its use of RCAs claiming that it is enforcing international law? Are there
restrictions on such actions? As Chayes and Meselson write, only in the narrowest of
circumstances should States be permitted to invoke international law to justify their “law
enforcement” activities, and that it would be an invitation to anarchy to permit states to
judge and enforce violations of international law themselves.137 As such, the avenue that
gives the greatest legitimacy for law enforcement internationally is through the UN.
Under the United Nations Charter, two organs are empowered to authorize international
134
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actions involving the use of force, namely the General Assembly and the Security
Council.138 Without their approval, such activities could not be viewed as legal law
enforcement. However, even with UN approval, such actions would still have to comply
with the prohibition under treaty and customary law of RCA use as a method of
warfare.139

4.4 Application to Fallujah
The above law will be applied to the Fallujah assault to ascertain whether the use of white
phosphorus smoke amounted to a use of a RCA as a method of warfare, and/or whether it
was a situation of law enforcement.

Firstly, white phosphorus smoke does have the RCA properties. As was mentioned
earlier, burning white phosphorus emits a dense white smoke composed of particles of
phosphorus pentoxide, which reacts with moisture in the air to form phosphoric acid.140
This acid may produce a variety of topically irritative injuries to the victim, as well as
eye, nose and respiratory irritation.141 The testing carried out in 1935 showed that the
symptoms were reversible when the victim left the exposure site. This fits the CWC
definition of an RCA under Article II(7), i.e., that it be a chemical producing sensory
irritation or disabling physical effects that disappear within a short time following
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termination of exposure. It would therefore be a violation if the US had used white
phosphorus smoke as a method of warfare.

Having been exposed to the chemical, and experiencing the above described symptoms,
the victims would have been temporarily incapacitated. This brings white phosphorus
within the general purpose criterion and the definition of a toxic chemical. In order to be
a lawful use of the chemical, the US would have to show that it was using the smoke for a
purpose not prohibited (i.e., law enforcement) and that the types and quantities were
consistent with such use. Although if white phosphorus were used as a method of warfare
it would already be a violation of the CWC, it is important to address the arguments that
could be raised in favour of the US use.

As the US has the broadest position on the issue of method of warfare, its arguments will
be used as the minimum standard. If the US had violated what it considered to be legal,
then it would also be illegal under the more restrictive international position. The US
considers RCA use in wartime situations to be legal if used for peaceful purposes. EO
11850 outlines five such purposes, and Condition 26 of the Senate CWC Ratification
Conditions provides a number of further permitted peaceful RCA applications. When
examining EO 11850, it is evident that the white phosphorus use in Fallujah was not a
situation of controlling rioting prisoners of war, nor a rescue mission for downed
aircrews, passengers, escaping prisoners of war, nor one of use in rear echelons outside
the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys. A possible argument is that the
Fallujah assault was one of EO 11850 condition (b) allowing the use of RCAs in
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situations where civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be
reduced or avoided. However, this does not seem to fit the witness accounts of how white
phosphorus was employed in Fallujah. All accounts, including official US government
statements, showed that US forces were firing it at positions where suspected insurgents
were believed to have barricaded themselves. They were thereby flushed out with the
agent and hit with high explosives upon their exiting the building. This does not fit with
EO 11850 condition (b) as there was no evidence that white phosphorus was used to
separate civilians from combatants in order to only kill the latter. Furthermore, the US
forces would engage those fleeing the building with lethal force. White phosphorus was
thus a force multiplier, used in conjunction with lethal force. This was not use as a
defensive or peaceful mode as required by EO 11850, nor did it fit within the
peacekeeping exceptions under Condition 26. Its use can only be considered as a method
of warfare.

In addition, neither of the two mitigating factors apply. As stated, white phosphorus was
not used as a means of avoiding civilian casualties, as otherwise those fleeing the
building would not have been engaged with lethal force. Furthermore, its use was not
incidental to attain a military objective. The primary objective was to flush the enemy out
of the building in order to kill them. This is a military objective in which white
phosphorus smoke was employed as a RCA as a method of warfare, violating CWC
provisions. As RCA, when used unlawfully, are considered to be chemical weapons, the
US had therefore used a chemical weapon in the Fallujah assault, violating its
international treaty, humanitarian and human rights law obligations.
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It is noteworthy to consider that a grey area exists between the law of armed conflict and
law enforcement by occupying powers, and between law enforcement and fighting a civil
war. Determining in which category a particular conflict or battle fits depends largely on
the facts and circumstances, as well as their interpretation. As the above analysis argues,
the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah was one of a method of warfare. However, could
the US, in its defence, argue that it was using the RCA for law enforcement purposes, as
permitted by the purposes not prohibited section in Article II(9)(d)?

Firstly, the issue of authorization to enforce the law must be established. It is arguable
that the US was authorized to undertake operations under both national and international
law. As outlined above, two US led assaults were conducted in Fallujah, one in April
2004, and then again in November 2004. During the April assault, no sovereign Iraqi
government existed and power rested in the US led Coalition Provisional Authority,
headed by US Administrator L. Paul Bremer. As no Iraqi government existed, the US as
the occupying power provided the national authorization. This was not a situation of the
US imposing its law on another sovereign state (as prohibited under international law)
because no sovereign Iraqi government existed at that time. Instead, the US as occupying
power was authorized to take actions to maintain peace and security in its area of control,
including law enforcement. In contrast, the situation differed for the November assault, as
on 28 June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority officially handed over power to the
Iraqi Interim Government, headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. The November assault
had received the necessary national authorization from Prime Minister Allawi.
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Consequently, it is arguable that both the April and November assaults received
authorization, once from the US as the occupying power, and once from the Iraqi Interim
Government.

Under international law, the US and UK were also authorized by the UN Security
Council to be the occupying power to restore the security and stability of Iraq.142 This
recognition was accorded in response to a letter sent by the US and UK to the Security
Council in which they acknowledged and accepted their legal status as occupying powers
in Iraq and accepted all the attendant rights and obligations under existing international
law.143 The resolution also called upon all concerned “to comply fully with their
obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”144 It furthermore required the US and UK,
consistent with the UN Charter and other relevant international law, “to promote the
welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including
in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability
[…]”145

This resolution, decided under Chapter VII, determined the situation in Iraq to be a threat
to international peace and security. It was the first official Council acknowledgement of
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the US and UK status as occupying powers. As such, they were authorized to ensure the
restoration of security and stability in Iraq. As required by Resolution 1483, the
occupying powers must adhere to the 1949 Geneva Conventions while restoring security
and stability. The Fourth Geneva Convention provides the rights and duties for the
occupying power. Of particular relevance is Article 27, which states that,

“Protected persons […] shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be
protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof […].
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and
security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of
war.”

Article 29 further builds on this stating that:

“The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is
responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of
any individual responsibility which may be incurred.”

In Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations IV, it further requires the occupying power
to “[…] take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety […]”.
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These provisions balance two competing interests, on the one hand, the obligation to treat
protected persons humanely, and on the other, the permission to take such measures of
control and security as may be necessary as a result of war. Combined with the
authorization in Resolution 1483, it is arguable that the US and UK as occupying powers,
were authorized to carry out law enforcement activities in order to ensure the restoration
of security and stability in Iraq, with the condition that protected persons were treated
humanely. Thereby, the first criterion, regarding authorization to enforce the law, is
satisfied.

The second issue is whether the use of white phosphorus in Fallujah complies with the
US interpretation of law enforcement. As is recalled, the US considers law enforcement
to be separate from domestic riot control and its attendant RCA definition. Domestic riot
control is a subset of law enforcement, along with a number of other possible scenarios.
Of those listed by Ambassador Ledogar to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
only one could potentially apply to the Fallujah incident, that being counter-terrorist
operations. However, from the facts it does not appear that Fallujah was a situation of law
enforcement involving counter-terrorist operations. Firstly, the means and methods of the
operation were inconsistent with the nature of law enforcement. Although the objective
of the assault involved freeing Fallujah of insurgents, it was not a situation of counterterrorism law enforcement. Rather, it was a military operation that was more akin to a
method of warfare than law enforcement. Just because major combat operations had
officially ended does not mean that all subsequent military operations are law
enforcement. It is the nature of the assault that must be considered. In the case of
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Fallujah, the use of white phosphorus smoke was inconsistent with the nature of law
enforcement. How could the situation be considered one of law enforcement when white
phosphorus was fired at suspected insurgent positions, only to be followed by rounds of
conventional explosives? From the accounts of the manner in which the ‘shake and bake’
missions were conducted, the Marines appeared completely oblivious of the target they
were firing upon. The US cannot assert that all those present in Fallujah were combatants
since having urged civilians to leave. The principles of humanitarian law in the Geneva
Conventions, and customary law, would still require the US to exercise the utmost regard
for civilian life, and it would be expected that many were still in Fallujah during the
assault. Not all civilians could or would have left. The mixture of civilians and
combatants, and the way in which white phosphorus was fired upon them, is completely
inconsistent with the law enforcement exception. It goes against the purposes and
principles of the CWC, and violates the obligations the US had as occupying power under
Resolution 1483 and the Geneva Conventions. Although the US was authorized to restore
public order and safety, such measures could not involve indiscriminately killing
civilians. Furthermore, it is a violation of Article 27 and 29 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention where civilians are required to be treated humanely and protected from
violence. The authorization from the Iraqi Interim Government is irrelevant as such
actions could never be authorized under the guise of law enforcement.

Furthermore, the types and quantities of the white phosphorus were not consistent with a
law enforcement situation. The allegations point to it being fired from mortar positions
some distance from the target. It was used, not as a smokescreen for US Marines to evade
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enemy fire, but to force the enemy from their protected positions. The fact that the
military had such large quantities of white phosphorus munitions available at its disposal
may point to a pre-meditation on the part of the military as to the manner that white
phosphorus would be used. Law enforcement cannot have involved using mortars and
explosives to restore public order. As such, the types and quantities of white phosphorus
were inconsistent with the law enforcement purposes.

In summary, the use of white phosphorus smoke amounts to the use of a chemical
weapon. It was used as a method of warfare during military operations. The lawful use of
chemicals for law enforcement purposes does not apply in the Fallujah assault as the
methods and means of the engagement are inconsistent with such use. As such, the US
has violated the CWC by using a chemical weapon in Iraq.

5.0 Incendiary Weapons
A further arms control regime which was potentially violated in Fallujah is that
governing incendiary weapons. Although there is no outright prohibition against their
use, certain restrictions exist under treaty and customary law regarding use against noncombatants. The following involves a discussion of the relevant law, and the application
to Fallujah.

5.1 Treaty Law
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The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate
Effects was negotiated in Geneva between 51 States. It opened for signature on 10
October 1980 and entered into force in December 1983. It aims to protect military troops
from inhumane injuries and prevent non-combatants from accidentally being wounded or
killed by certain types of arms.146 The CCW is an umbrella convention, meaning that it
only contains general provisions. The substantive law on which specific weapons are
restricted and prohibited is found annexed to the Convention in a number of protocols.
Three protocols existed upon entry into force, each dealing with a specific weapon, the
relevant one being Protocol III which deals with incendiary weapons. The CCW required
states to consent to a minimum of two of the three protocols. The Convention was
initially designed to deal only with international armed conflicts. However, with the rise
of non-international armed conflicts throughout much of the early 1990s, an amendment
was made to a single protocol in 1996 making it applicable to internal armed conflict.
This was extended in 2001 to apply to the entire Convention.

The US signed the CCW on 8 April 1982. However it was not until 24 March 1995 that it
ratified Protocols I and II. The US is yet to ratify Protocol III.
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Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CCW has no verification mechanism,
consequently relying upon states to individually verify and enforce its provisions. This
creates a major weakness in the regime.

5.1.1 Protocol III
Protocol III is of particular importance to the present discussion. The Protocol contains
two articles. Article I provides important definitions. Of particular relevance is the
definition of an incendiary weapon, which is defined as:

“[…] any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to
objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat,
or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance
delivered on the target.”147

Examples in the Convention of the form that such weapons can take include
flamethrowers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of
incendiary substances.148 The Convention expressly excludes a number of substances
from falling under the incendiary weapons definition:

(i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as
illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems;
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(ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation
effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing
projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combinedeffects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed
to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military objectives,
such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities.149

Therefore, for a weapon to be considered an incendiary weapon, it must intentionally set
fire or burn. If it ‘merely’ ignites fire or burns as a side effect, it would not be considered
as an incendiary weapon under the Protocol.150

Article II spells out the substantive prohibitions. The main aim of this Article is to protect
the civilian population in the vicinity of the conflict zone from being targeted, and
suffering from the effects of the attack. It includes four main prohibitions. Firstly, under
Article 2(1), it is prohibited in all circumstances “[…] to make the civilian population as
such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary
weapons.”151 This prohibition mirrors more general bans on targeting civilians under
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and under customary international law.
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Secondly, Article 2(2) prohibits in all circumstances “[…] to make any military objective
located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary
weapons.”152 This broad prohibition against attacking a military object153 within a civilian
concentration154 with air-delivered incendiary weapons has been criticized for being too
restrictive. It could potentially immunize a military objective from attack by air-delivered
incendiary weapons, in a situation where such weapons may be the only appropriate
means of attack.155

Thirdly, under Article 2(3), it is

“[…] prohibited to make any military objective located within a
concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary
weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such
military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians
and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary
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effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects.”156

Whereas Article 2(2) prohibits the use by air-delivered incendiary weapons against a
military target within a concentration of civilians, Article 2(3) applies to non-air
delivered incendiary weapons and provides restrictions on their use. There are two
requirements for the use of incendiary weapons to be permitted: firstly, the military
object must be clearly separated from the concentration of civilians; secondly, all feasible
precautions157 must have been taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military object
in order to minimize loss of or injury to civilian life and objects. This is a pragmatic
provision which acknowledges that incendiary weapons do provide utility to the military
and may in fact cause less civilian death and injury than other conventional bombs and
munitions.

From these provisions, it is clear that the Protocol permits the use of incendiary weapons
against combatants. The Protocol only offers some limited protections to civilians,
restricting incendiary weapon use in such a manner that civilians are not harmed. It still
permits the use of non-air-delivered incendiaries if all feasible measures were taken not
to harm civilians or civilian objects. Civilians may not be made the object of an attack,
156
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and if military objects are located in their vicinity, no air delivered incendiaries may be
used.

5.1.2 US Position Towards Protocol III
As mentioned above, the US has not signed or ratified Protocol III. President Clinton,
upon submitting the Convention to the US Senate for approval in 1994, recommended
that the US exercise its right to ratify the Convention accepting only the first two
Protocols and not Protocol III. He stated that Protocol III was not sent to the Senate

“[…] because of concerns about the acceptability of the Protocol from a
military point of view. Incendiary weapons have significant military value,
particularly with respect to flammable military targets that cannot so readily
be destroyed with conventional explosives.”158

However, even though incendiary weapons have such utility, President Clinton
reaffirmed that,

“[…] the United States must retain its ability to employ incendiaries to hold
high priority military targets such as those at risk in a manner consistent
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with the principle of proportionality which governs the use of all weapons
under existing law.”159

President Clinton proposed the inclusion of a reservation to the Protocol, which would
balance the US national security interests with those of international humanitarian law.
The proposed reservation would reserve the right to use incendiaries against military
objectives located in concentrations of civilians where it is judged that such use would
cause fewer casualties and less collateral damage than alternative weapons.160 Such a
reservation would remove the requirement that civilian and military objects be clearly
separated and that all feasible precautions were taken to minimize loss or injury to
civilians. If implemented, this amounts to a revision of the legal obligations of Article 2
of the Protocol on the US so that the test of whether the use of an incendiary weapon is
permitted in such circumstances would depend on whether it is judged that such use
would cause fewer civilian casualties and less collateral damage than alternative
weapons.161 As Protocol III was never submitted for Senate ratification, this reservation
was never implemented.
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An analysis was conducted by the US Department of Defense’s Office for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics regarding the acceptability of incendiary weapons from a
military standpoint. It made the following conclusion:

“Incendiary weapons have significant potential military value, particularly
with respect to certain high-priority military targets. Incendiaries are the
only weapons which can effectively destroy certain counter-proliferation
targets such as biological weapons facilities which require high heat to
eliminate bio-toxins. To use only high explosives would risk the widespread
release of dangerous contaminants with potentially disastrous consequences
for the civilian population. Certain flammable military targets are also more
readily destroyed by incendiaries. For example, a fuel depot could require
up to eight times the bombs and sorties to destroy using only high
explosives rather than incendiaries. Such an increase means a significantly
greater humanitarian risk of collateral damage. The United States must
retain its ability to employ incendiaries to hold high priority military targets
such as these at risk in a manner consistent with the principle of
proportionality which governs the use of all weapons under existing law.”162

As the US is not a party to Protocol III, it is not bound by the various provisions it
provides. The US maintains the utility of incendiary weapons for military purposes and
reserves its right to use them.
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5.2 Customary International Law
The US may however still be bound by a number of restrictions that exist in customary
international law. The ICRC, in its study of customary international humanitarian law,
identifies two primary rules in particular. The first regulates the use of incendiary
weapons in situations where civilians may be affected; the second governs the use of
incendiary weapons against combatants. Both of these will be discussed.

5.2.1 Incendiary Use and Civilians
The ICRC identifies the following customary norm to have been developed:

“Rule 84. If incendiary weapons are used, particular care must be taken to
avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss to civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects.”

There are a number of similarities between this Rule and Article 2(1) of Protocol III of
the CCW, prohibiting that civilians and civilian objects become the targets of attack by
incendiary weapons. Both appear to give protection to civilians. However, Protocol III
Article 2(1) creates a more encompassing prohibition (prohibiting in all circumstances),
compared to that of Rule 84 (particular care must be taken to avoid, and minimise).
Although making civilians the object of attack would be equally a violation of Rule 84 as
that of Article 2(1), Rule 84 would seem to allow incendiary weapon use against a
military target in a concentration of civilians as long as care was taken to avoid or
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minimise incidental loss to civilian life, injury and so forth. The ICRC states that even
though Article 2(1) is more forceful than the customary Rule 84, the former is also part of
customary law as it is a direct application of the principle of distinction.163 According to
the ICRC, the other three paragraphs in Article II do not have customary force.164
However, they could be considered to be guidelines for the implementation of the
customary rule that particular care must be taken to avoid civilian casualties.165

The evidence the ICRC Study provides to support the foundation of Rule 84 is found in a
number of state documents, military manuals and statements. Firstly, many military
manuals when providing the rules for incendiary weapon use refer either directly to the
rules in Protocol III,166 or state the requirement to avoid, or at least minimise, civilian
casualties.167 An overwhelming proportion of the military manuals make specific
reference to the need to safeguard civilian lives during incendiary weapon use. A large
proportion also forbids the use of incendiary weapons against a military objective situated
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within a civilian population centre, 168 or where it cannot be clearly separated from the
civilian population.169

Secondly, under the national legislation of a number of countries, the use of incendiary
weapons is forbidden where the military objective cannot be clearly separated from the
civilian population, civilian objects or the surrounding environment.170 Estonia and
Hungary even consider widespread use of incendiary weapons in such a situation to
amount to a war crime.171

The US has contributed to the development of customary international law on this issue.
However, its legislation and military manuals provide less restrictive rules on incendiary
weapon use.

The US Air Force Pamphlet states that:

“The potential of fire to spread beyond the immediate target area has also
raised concerns about uncontrollable or indiscriminate effects affecting the
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civilian population or civilian objects. Accordingly, any applicable rules of
engagement relating to incendiary weapons must be followed closely to
avoid controversy. The manner in which incendiary weapons are employed
is also regulated by the other principles and rules regulating armed force …
In particular, the potential capacity of fire to spread must be considered in
relation to the rules protecting civilians and civilian objects … For example,
incendiary weapons should be avoided in urban areas, to the extent that
other weapons are available and as effective.”172

The US Naval Handbook states the following:

“Incendiary devices such as tracer ammunition, thermite bombs, flame
throwers, napalm, and other incendiary weapons and agents, are lawful
weapons. Where incendiary devices are the weapons of choice, they should
be employed in a manner that does not cause incidental injury or collateral
damage that is excessive in light of the military advantage anticipated by the
attack.”173

Neither of these statements provide a prohibition on the use of incendiary weapons in
areas of civilian concentration. Although the statement from the US Air Force Pamphlet
does recommend avoiding incendiary weapons use in urban areas, the usage of the words
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‘should be avoided’ would allow their use in certain circumstances where the commander
deems it necessary. The same could be said regarding the US Naval Handbook statement
which although stating that incendiary weapons should not be used in a manner which
causes excessive incidental injury or collateral damage, if the military advantage
anticipated outweighs the costs to civilians, then their use is permitted. Such guidance
provides extensive room for interpretation.

During negotiations for Protocol III of the CCW, a number of proposals were
made to establish the limits of the situations in which incendiary weapons could
be used. At the CCW Preparatory Conference in 1979, the US stated that although
it could not accept a restriction on the use of incendiary weapons against
combatants,

“[…] an agreement on limiting the use of incendiaries in areas containing
civilian concentrations was appropriate and possible … The
[Australia/Netherlands] proposal was the maximum that some of the
principal interested parties at the Conference would be prepared to
accept.”174

So with this being the US position, it is important to ascertain the Australian and
Netherlands proposals in order to establish what the maximum restrictions the US
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considered there to be on the use of incendiary weapons in areas containing civilian
concentrations.

After a number of draft proposals and revisions, in 1979, Australia and the Netherlands
submitted a draft proposal stating that

“[…] as a consequence of the rules of international law applicable with
respect to the protection of civilians against the effects of hostilities, it is
prohibited to make the civilian population as such as well as individual
civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary munitions.”175

Furthermore, incendiary weapons used against military objectives in civilian
concentrations were not prohibited,

“[…] provided the attack is otherwise lawful and that all feasible
precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military objective
and to avoid incidental loss of civilian life and injury to civilians.”176

These statements show what the US considers to be the maximum limit of the law on
incendiary weapon use in civilian concentrations. A summary of the above law would be
175
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as follows:

1. It is prohibited to make the civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary
weapons.
2. Military objectives in civilian concentrations may be the object of attack. Such
objects may only be attacked if
i.

all feasible precautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the
military objective; and,

ii.

to avoid incidental loss of civilian life and injury to civilians.

i. Principle of distinction
What may further bind the US are the rules in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions (many of which have attained customary status). Despite the US not being a
State Party to the Protocol, many of these rules are codifications of customary
international law. The Protocol obliges respect for the principle of distinction. The basic
rule upholding this is Article 48 which requires parties to a conflict at all times to
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and to direct their operations
only against military objectives.177 Therefore, civilians may never be made the object of
an attack. The International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion
upheld the principle of distinction to be one of the “cardinal principles” of the law of
armed conflict and one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary
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law.”178 Article 51 of Protocol I states that civilians179 shall not be the object of attack180
and shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations.181
Article 51 codifies a principle of customary international law prohibiting indiscriminate
attacks against civilians.182 Indiscriminate attacks are defined as:

“a. those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
b. those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
c. those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol.”183

This definition has been considered part of customary international law and is included in
a large number of national military manuals.184 Furthermore, it has been relied upon by
178
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states not party to the Protocol, including the US.185 Article 54(4)(c) relates to weapons
whose effects cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law. By
definition, such an attack is an indiscriminate attack.186 The ICRC points to practice
which illustrates that such limits are in regards to weapons whose effects are
uncontrollable in time and space and are likely to strike military objectives and civilians
without distinction, such as biological weapons.187 Incendiary weapons would also fit this
description.188

In addition, Art 51(5) provides two examples of what would constitute an indiscriminate
attack, the relevant one to the present discussion being (5)(b):

“an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”189

This rule encapsulates the principle of proportionality where a balance is struck between
the military necessity for eliminating a military object and avoiding incidental or
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collateral civilian casualties.190 It has also been considered part of customary international
law by the ICRC. The information available to the commander at the time of the attack
must be taken into account, not that available in hindsight.191

Precautions must be made when launching military attacks, including the requirement of
constant care to spare the civilian population.192 This principle links back to the basic rule
in Art 48 requiring that military objects and civilians be distinguished. Article 57 lists a
number of precautionary rules, including the verification of the identity of the object of
attack as a military objective; the application of the principle of proportionality in
situations when attacks against military objectives may be expected to cause collateral
civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects; the choice of methods or means of
inflicting injury on the enemy with the view of selecting that which poses the least danger
to the civilian population.193 The ICRC considers these precautionary rules to be part of
customary international law.194

5.2.2 Incendiary Use and Combatants
The second norm identified by the ICRC regulating the use of incendiary weapons is as
follows:
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“Rule 85. The anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons is prohibited,
unless it is not feasible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors
de combat.”

The ICRC stated that in the initial discussions and negotiations, a number of States were
pushing for a complete ban on incendiary use against combatants. However, it soon
became clear that the Protocol would not receive widespread support if such a broad
prohibition were included. As such, a fallback position was posited which would have
prohibited incendiary use against combatants except when they were under armoured
protection or in field fortifications. This pragmatic proposal attempted to balance the
military necessity of incendiary weapons against the ideal of humanizing the battlefield.
However, even this position received opposition, most notably from the US and the UK.
As a result, no prohibition against incendiary weapon use on combatants was included in
the Protocol.

According to the ICRC, despite such prohibitions not being included, it did not mean that
the use of incendiary weapons against combatants was lawful in all circumstances.195
There is a broad spectrum within the various national positions on incendiary weapon use
on combatants. They range from the restriction that incendiaries may only be used when
combatants are under armoured protections or in field fortifications,196 to the prohibition
195
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on their use when causing unnecessary suffering,197 to the complete prohibition on their
use because it always causes unnecessary suffering.198

The US position on this is articulated in the US Field Manual, where it is stated that:

“[…] the use of weapons which employ fire, such as tracer flame-throwers,
napalm and other incendiary agents, against targets requiring their use is not
a violation of international law. They should not, however, be employed in
such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering to individuals.”199

In addition, the US Air Force Pamphlet provides a similar restriction:

“Incendiary weapons […] have widespread uses in armed conflict. Although
evoking intense international concern, combined with attempts to ban their
use, state practice indicates clearly they are regarded as lawful in situations
requiring their use. […] [I]ncendiary weapons must not be used so as to
cause unnecessary suffering.”200
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With the various statements, from the US and other states, the ICRC concludes that a
customary rule has developed prohibiting incendiary weapons use against combatants if
such use would cause unnecessary suffering, ie, if it is feasible to use a less harmful
weapon to render a combatant hors de combat.201

ii. Unnecessary Suffering
The determining factor for the above rule is whether unnecessary suffering was caused.
The prohibition against this exists in both treaty and customary law. Article 35 of the
1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states that:

“1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods
of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”

The ICRC study has included this prohibition in its study of customary international
humanitarian law. Rule 70 states “The use of means and methods of warfare which are of
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.”202
Importantly, the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
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Opinion203 (1996) held that the rule prohibiting unnecessary suffering to combatants was
a cardinal principle and that this outlawed certain weapons irrespective of whether they
were specifically prohibited by treaty or not.204

The two quoted paragraphs of this Article must be read together. Paragraph 1 provides a
general prohibition, whereas paragraph 2 specifies an implementing rule derived from the
principles in Paragraph 1. According to Bothe, Partsch and Solf, the prohibition in
Paragraph 1 contains two limitations on the choice of methods and means or warfare.
These include such rules as prohibiting poisoned weapons, the use of weapons and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;
perfidious killing, wounding, or capturing of enemy combatants; attacks on civilians, and
so forth.205 The second layer of limitations provides the two complementary principles of
necessity and humanity, which are the foundation for the international humanitarian law.
Necessity justifies those measures of military violence not forbidden by international law,
which are relevant and proportionate to securing the prompt submission of the enemy
with the least possible expenditure of economic or human resources.206 Balancing this,
humanity forbids those measures of violence that are not necessary (that is, relevant and
proportionate) to the achievement of a definite military advantage.207 Applying this
limitation to the rule in Paragraph 2, the balance is between necessity, on the one hand,
203
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and the expected injury or suffering inflicted on the person on the other.208 The test
becomes whether the suffering is needless, superfluous, or manifestly disproportionate to
the military advantage reasonable expected from the use of the weapon.209 The
International Court of Justice defined unnecessary suffering as “a harm greater than that
unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.”210 An additional consideration is
whether alternative means can be used to achieve the same military objective.

The term ‘suffering’ has proven difficult to define. Generally speaking, suffering is
considered to include both the physical and psychological effects of weapons, the longterm nature of the injuries, the painfulness or severity of the wounds, mortality rates and
the treatment available in conflict situations.211

The ICRC study created a list of methods and means of warfare that could be considered
to fall under this rule, which included among others incendiary weapons.212 There was
not, however, sufficient agreement to establish that they were prohibited.

5.3 Application to Fallujah
A number of questions must be answered in order to ascertain whether the US violated
international law regarding use of an incendiary weapon in Fallujah. Firstly, is white
208
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phosphorus in the manner used considered an incendiary weapon? Secondly, irrespective
of not being a State Party to Protocol III, did the US actions comply with the treaty’s
requirements? Thirdly, did the US adhere to the rules of customary international law
regarding incendiary weapon use? These three questions will be discussed in turn.

Firstly, according to Protocol III, for a substance to be an incendiary weapon, it must be
“[…] primarily designed to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat
or combination thereof […]”. Burning white phosphorus particles are an incendiary
weapon. Upon contact with exposed skin or mucus membranes, it causes burn injuries
through the action of heat and flame. Its employment was not as its other purpose of a
smokescreen, rather, its utilization involved an intention to exploit its incendiary
qualities. Furthermore, the substance must not be expressly excluded as a weapon with
incidental incendiary effects under Article I(1)(b) of the Protocol. The ‘shake and bake’
missions were not using the incendiary qualities of white phosphorus as an incidental
effect. Rather, those qualities were the primary purpose of their use. Therefore, white
phosphorus is not excluded from the definition, and is considered an incendiary weapon
under the Protocol.

Secondly, although not being bound by the provision of Protocol III, did the US comply
with its requirements? There are three prohibitions relevant to the present discussion. The
first is whether civilians were made the object of the attack, as prohibited by Article 2(1)
and customary law. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. In all the accounts,
the object of attack for the US forces were the suspected insurgents, not the civilians. The
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second prohibition in Article 2 bans the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against
military objectives located in a concentration of civilians. Again, there is no evidence
suggesting that the US fired white phosphorus from air-delivered systems. The accounts
relied upon refer to US forces firing white phosphorus from mortars. The third
prohibition bans attacking military objectives located in a concentration of civilians with
non-air-delivered mechanisms unless the civilians are clearly separated from the military
object and all feasible precautions are taken to limit incendiary effects to the military
objective, thereby minimizing incidental loss or injury of civilians. From the accounts, it
appears that this provision has been violated. The US forces fired white phosphorus from
ground delivered systems without knowing what target they were hitting. During the
assault, US Marines reported a significant civilian presence in Fallujah. Judging from the
nature of urban warfare, it is unlikely that they were clearly separated from the military
objectives. It is likely that there was no intention of killing or injuring civilians through
such actions. However, the use of an incendiary weapon in an urban combat situation
where civilians were still clearly present is a violation of Article 2(3). In addition, as the
US government has not released information regarding its operational handling of the
Fallujah assault, it is unclear whether or what precautions were taken by US commanders
to limiting the effects of white phosphorus to combatants. Nonetheless, the method of
deployment, the indiscriminate nature of the agent, and the urban setting, do not support
the view that all feasible precautions were undertaken. According to the Protocol, feasible
precautions include all those practicable or practically possible taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time. Further precautions should have been undertaken to
confirm the military nature of the target. As the US is not party to Protocol III and Article
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2(3) is not part of customary law, this provision has merely the status of a non-binding
guideline, and its violation will have no real consequences for the US.

However, customary law binds the US and evidence suggests that violations of this law
occurred. Firstly, the US breached the customary norm that particular care must be taken
to avoid and minimize incidental loss or injury to civilians. Although mirroring Article
2(3) above, this law is more lenient and allows some collateral damage provided all
feasible precautions are taken to avoid or minimize it. As mentioned above, there is no
evidence of feasible precautions being taken during the ‘shake and bake’ missions. Its
method of employment shows an utter lack of precautionary measures as those being
fired upon could (and many cases were) civilians. The reports also suggest that white
phosphorus did injure and kill civilians. Furthermore, the principle of distinction outlaws
any indiscriminate attacks against civilians. White phosphorus’s utilization involved a
method and means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by
Protocol I.213 Furthermore, due to the urban setting, the attacks could be expected to
cause incidental loss and injury to civilians. Such assaults were excessive to the concrete
and direct military advantage as it involved firing an incendiary weapon in a setting
where civilians and combatants were mixed in the hope that those fleeing were
insurgents. This amounts to a violation of the principles of proportionality and
distinction. The US actions also violated their own military manuals which required that
if other more effective weapons causing less suffering were available, such should be
used in place of incendiaries. A statement in the Field Artillery article suggests that other
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weapons were available, but that they were used only to save the white phosphorus for
lethal missions. This shows the intent for which white phosphorus was exploited. Any
commander would have been aware of the inherent risks of such actions to the civilian
population.

The same consideration regarding choice of a less harmful weapon is central to the
customary rule that the anti-personnel use of an incendiary weapon is prohibited, unless it
is not feasible to use a less harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat. Injury and
death by white phosphorus would involve unnecessary and superfluous suffering.
However, the law states that it is not unlawful to kill combatants with incendiaries unless
other weapons are available which are less harmful. As mentioned earlier, other weapons
were allegedly available, however, such a determination remains for the commander on
the field to make. With little battle information in the public domain, it is out of the scope
of this paper to analyse this issue. If it were found that other weapons and tactics could
have been used, it would only further indict the US forces for their actions in Fallujah.

In summary, the evidence suggests that the US violated its customary obligations to
protect the civilian population. It used an indiscriminate weapon in an environment where
civilians and combatants were mixed, thereby violating its obligations under the law of
armed conflict. More facts are required to ascertain whether the use against combatants
was unlawful.

6.0 Conclusion
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The use of white phosphorus in Fallujah was in violation of a number of international
treaty and customary obligations binding upon the US armed forces. The white
phosphorus smoke was used in a manner inconsistent with the US obligations under the
CWC, that is, its use as a precursor chemical and as a riot control agent as a method of
warfare. It thus amounted to the use of a chemical weapon. There is some irony in this
conclusion considering that Iraq never used chemical weapons against the US and UK
despite the overly touted allegations that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological
weapon stockpiles. The US also violated its obligations under the customary rules
regarding the use of an indiscriminate incendiary weapon in a mixed civilians and
combatant setting. Different weapons and tactics should have been used to avoid civilian
casualties and the violation of international law of armed conflict. However, the expected
consequences for the US forces are minimal. The US government must prosecute the
perpetrators under its code of military justice. It is unlikely that any action will be taken
internationally by other states or relevant international organizations on this issue due to
the highly politically charged nature of the Iraq war and the US secrecy of its methods
and means of warfare. Changes to the US rules of engagement and military manuals, as
well as better training for its soldiers, would be the most effective way to avert future
violations.
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